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Healthcare Fraud Investigations: Overview of
Overbroad Investigative Regime and
Recommendations for a More Targeted Approach
Salvatore Filippello*
This paper explores the necessary but currently flawed United States
federal investigation and enforcement regime of healthcare fraud and abuse
and makes recommendations on how it can be improved by focusing on the
types of activities that harm patients and the public at large. The current
healthcare fraud enforcement is improperly focused on technical violations
of outdated and complex healthcare compliance statutes such as the AntiKickback statute (AKS) and the Stark law (Stark).1 This focus is driven by
recovering millions of dollars of back payments from health systems and
doctors, which places an undue burden on providers and ultimately hurts
patient care. However, this is not to say that the investigation and
enforcement regime is unnecessary because healthcare fraud and abuse
certainly exists.
The United States federal government should implement a better approach
to its healthcare fraud investigations by focusing on substantive fraud and
abuse, which harms patients, taxpayers, or both; thus, avoiding pursuit of
technical violations of the laws that ultimately do no harm. While the current
fraud and abuse investigative regime often brings in substantial awards from
Medicare participants, it often does more harm than good to providers, who
could be financially crippled by defending themselves against potential
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violations that do not meaningfully harm patients or cost taxpayer dollars.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) through the Health and Human Services
(HHS) and Office of Inspector General (OIG) (collectively the HHS OIG) is
eager to pursue the healthcare fraud settlement rather than stopping the fraud
itself. This results in sweeping investigations that look more like fishing
expeditions than targeted investigations into specific incidents of fraud.2
This is bolstered by the numbers of investigations that have increased
substantially in recent years. Since 2011, the number of cases brought by
whistleblowers grew from around 200 per year in the early 21st century to
more than 400 per year.3 This more than doubling of healthcare fraud
investigations has become a rather lucrative endeavor for the U.S. Justice
Department, netting the government more than $2 billion annually since
2010.4 In light of the potentially substantial recoupment of government
funds, HHS OIG investigators cast a wide net, often asking for up to 10 years
of data from providers.5 The DOJ is effectively putting the burden on
providers to prove their innocence, which is placing a tremendous financial
and administrative encumbrance on providers.6
While fraud investigations have steadily increased over the last twenty
years, there are still areas of fraud that cost the government considerable
sums and are not being fully investigated.7 Instead of using a metaphorical
fishing net to capture any and all potential fraud and abuse inevitably
catching innocent providers, the OIG should instead use a metaphorical
harpoon to specifically target potential whales that are doing significant
damage to the healthcare ecosystem. This article will explore several striking
examples of such substantive fraud. The first is laboratory services
performed in urban or suburban areas billed through rural facilities for
significantly higher reimbursement. The second is Medicare Advantage
insurance carriers paying physicians handsomely for completing medical
forms that are intended to overstate the comorbidities of patients, therefore
inflating their payments from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). The third is a few examples of a broader category of fraud
and abuse wherein healthcare providers subject unsuspecting patients to
2

Alex Kacik, Healthcare Fraud Probes Grow in Number, Intensity, MODERN HEALTHCARE
(Oct. 3, 2020, 1:00AM), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/law-regulation/healthcarefraud-probes-grow-number-intensity.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
See id.; see also David Engel, et al., Op-Ed: Fraud Is Rampant in Medicare Advantage –
Enforcing the False Claims Act Can Help, MEDPAGE TODAY (Mar. 13, 2021),
https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/medicare/91616 (explaining the
increased costs to the federal government and the vulnerability of these public funds to
fraud).
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dangerous procedures and/or treatments that are completely unnecessary in
order to profit from the government.
I.

PRIMER ON FRAUD AND ABUSE, CURRENT ENFORCEMENT
CONSIDERATIONS

Since the 2010 creation and passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA),
the federal government has been using powerful new anti-fraud tools to
prevent healthcare fraud in addition to enhanced use of the False Claims Act
(FCA).8 This article will provide a brief summary of some of these new tools
and how the FCA has become a critical tool that has caused consternation
and apprehension among healthcare providers.
A. ACA Enhancements to Fraud Investigations and Enforcement
Since the advent of the ACA, the HHS OIG and CMS have taken several
initiatives to create synergies between various private and public entities,
created new data analytics tools, and enhanced provider screening and
enrollment requirements.9 Together, these enhancements have significantly
reduced the amount of waste, fraud, and abuse for the Medicare program.10
However, there is still much work to do as fraud is continuing to occur in
plain sight.11
1. Federal, State & Private Partnerships
The first enforcement tool that has played a critical role in the expanded
investigation and enforcement of healthcare fraud is the Health Care Fraud
Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT).12 HEAT is a joint
initiative between HHS OIG and DOJ with a Medicare Fraud Strike Force
composed of OIG and DOJ analysts, investigators, and prosecutors targeting
fraud schemes that emerge or migrate and are sometimes perpetrated by
8
CMS Newsroom, The Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Protects
Consumers and Taxpayers by Combating Health Care Fraud, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/health-carefraud-and-abuse-control-program-protects-consumers-and-taxpayers-combating-health-care.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
See Engel, supra note 7 (explaining why fraud associated with Medicare programs
continues to occur); Richard S. Cooper et al., Taking Advantage of Payor Contracts: Pitfalls
of Hospital Pass-Through Billing Arrangements, HEALTHCARE NEWS (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.healthcarenewssite.com/articles/08-2018/wa-mcdonaldhopkins-0818.php.
12
CMS Newsroom, supra note 8.
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criminals pretending to be healthcare providers.13 Through multi-district
coordinated national investigations, the HEAT Strike Force has enjoyed a
95% conviction rate and recovered billions in health care fraud.14
Another collaborative effort between government entities that has helped
dramatically increase both healthcare fraud investigations and convictions is
the Health Care Fraud Prevention Partnership (HFPP).15 The HFPP was
created by the Obama Administration in 201216 and is a collaboration
between private insurers, states, DOJ, OIG, FBI, CMS, and associations to
take substantive actions.17 These actions include payment system edits,
revocations, and payment suspensions to prevent fraudulent payments and
bolster the federal government’s collective forces against healthcare fraud,
waste and abuse.18
2. Fraud Prevention Systems
In addition to the federal, state, and private partnerships created in the
wake of the ACA, the HHS OIG continues to use state-of-the-art data
analysis, predictive analytics, trend evaluation, and modeling approaches to
analyze and target perpetrators of healthcare fraud.19 Teams of analysts use
data to examine Medicare claims for known fraud patterns, identify trends,
and calculate ratios of services compared to national averages.20 Since 2011,
CMS has used the Fraud Prevention System (FPS) on all Medicare fee-forservice claims nationally.21 The FPS applies predictive analytics to claims
before making payments to detect anomalies and suspicious billing
behavior.22 CMS uses the FPS to trigger actions that can be swiftly
implemented and the results have been extremely promising.23 In the 4 years
between 2011 and 2015, the HHS OIG certified savings attributable to the
FPS of $820 million, which represented more than a 10-to-1 return on
investment for its first three years of implementation.24
13

Id.
Id.
15
Id.
16
About the Partnership, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 2, 2021, 10:00
AM), https://www.cms.gov/hfpp/about.
17
CMS Newsroom, supra note 8.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAUD PREVENTION SYSTEM
SECOND IMPLEMENTATION YEAR 1 (2014).
22
CMS Newsroom, supra note 8.
23
CTRS. MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 21, at 1.
24
Office of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet: The Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program
Protects Consumers and Taxpayers by Combating Health Care Fraud, DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb.
14
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3. Enhanced Provider Screening and Enrollment Requirements
The ACA required CMS to revalidate all then existing 1.6 million
Medicare suppliers using risk-based screening requirements.25
Consequently, CMS deactivated over 500,000 enrollments, which required a
resubmission and approval of an updated enrollment application. CMS also
revoked over 34,000 enrollments, which effectively barred these providers
from re-entering the Medicare program for one to three years.26 These
enhanced screening and enrollment requirements have led to more than $2.4
billion in estimated Medicare savings from 2010 to 2015.27
B. AKS, Stark, & Other Fraud and Abuse Statutes
There are several federal and state laws that are powerful tools for the U.S.
DOJ through the HHS OIG and various state Attorneys General. The AKS
is a criminal statute that prohibits the knowing and willful payment of
“remuneration” to induce patient referrals or other business dealings
involving any item or service payable by Federal Health Care programs (such
as Medicare or Medicaid).28 Remuneration includes anything of value and
can take many forms besides actual money.29 It can be free rent, expensive
hotel stays and meals, excessive compensation for medical directorships or
consultancies, or even excessive discounts that do not meet the safe harbor.30
The Physician Self-Referral Law, which is referred to as the Stark law, makes
it illegal for a physician to refer patients to receive “designated health
services” reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid from facilities with which the
physician or an immediate family member has a financial relationship.31
There are some exceptions where the physician can refer patients to receive
designated health services from a facility with which the physician or family
member has a financial relationship, such as fair market rental of office
space, fair market rental of equipment, bona fide employment relationships,

26, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-health-care-fraud-and-abuse-controlprogram-protects-conusmers-and-taxpayers.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Office of the Inspector General, A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws,
U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (last visited Aug. 07, 2021),
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/01laws.asp.
29
Id.
30
Id.; see 42 CFR Part 1001 (2020) (defining the safe harbor and kickbacks which violate it).
31
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
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and in-office ancillary services.32 The most problematic part of the Stark law
is that it “is a strict liability statute, which means that proof of specific intent
to violate the law is not required.”33 Considering the steep penalties that
include fines and exclusion from the Medicare and Medicaid program, this
should make every physician hyper cognizant of these technical rules.34 In
addition to these federal laws prohibiting the payment of remuneration for
referrals, many states have their own laws governing kickbacks for Medicaid
services.35 Many states also have false claims acts that govern claims
submitted to Medicaid.36 While healthcare fraud and abuse statutes have
succeeded at curbing fraud, they have had an unintended effect on providers
and sometimes become a drain on the healthcare system as a whole.37
C. False Claims Act
The civil FCA, 31 U.S.C. § § 3729-3733, was created to protect the
government from being overcharged for goods and services or being charged
for goods and services that are inadequate or were not performed.38 In the
healthcare context, the FCA makes it illegal to submit claims for payment to
Medicare or Medicaid that are knowingly false or fraudulent.39
Filing false claims to Medicare or Medicaid may result in fines of up to
three times the amount of the claims plus a maximum of $22,363 per claim
filed.40 Each item or service that is billed to Medicare or Medicaid is a
violation of the civil FCA, so the fines can be astronomical.41 Not only are
the potential fines significant, but the claim itself does not have to be
fraudulent to be considered a false claim —a technical violation of the AKS
32

See 42 CFR § 411.355 (2020); 42 CFR § 411.357 (2020) (describing exceptions to the
financial relationships rule set out by the Stark Law).
33
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
34
Id.
35
See e.g., New York: Social Services Law § 366-d, Pennsylvania: 62 Pa. Stat. and Cons.
Stat. Ann. §1407(a)(2), New Jersey: NJSA § 30:4D-17, Illinois: 305 ILCS 5/8A-3(b) of the
Illinois Public Aid Code (illustrating a selection of statutes that prevent kickbacks and
excess compensation for Medicare services and criminalize violations of said statutes).
36
See State False Claims Act Reviews, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/state-false-claims-act-reviews/ (explaining that in order to qualify
for a financial incentive a State’s false claims act, among other requirements, must establish
liability to the State for false or fraudulent claims with respect to Medicaid spending).
37
See generally Regulatory Burden Overwhelming Providers, Diverting Clinicians from
Patient Care, AM. HOSP. ASS’N 1 (Oct. 2017), https://www.aha.org/system/files/201801/regulatory-burden-overwhelming-providers-infographic.pdf (discussing the adverse
effects increasing mandatory regulations have on providers and patient care).
38
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
39
Id.
40
Id.; Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 85 Fed. Reg. 37004, 37006 (June 19,
2020) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 85).
41
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
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or Stark laws can cause the entire claim to be a violation of the civil FCA.42
Perhaps most troubling of all with the civil FCA is the fact that there is no
specific intent to defraud required.43 The knowledge requirements of the civil
FCA include situations in which the actor deliberately ignored or recklessly
disregarded the veracity of the information.44 This is especially troubling
when considering the fact that the Stark law is also a strict liability statute
and does not require specific intent to violate the law.45 Taken together, a
provider could not intend to violate Stark, but technically violate Stark, and
be charged with violating both Stark and the FCA, leading to crushing civil
monetary penalties for an innocent mistake.46 Also, there is a criminal FCA
(18 U.S.C. § 287), which provides for imprisonment up to five years and
criminal fines for knowingly submitting false claims to Medicare or
Medicaid.47
The original purpose of the FCA in 1863 during the Civil War was to
prevent objectively deceptive conduct by defense contractors, such as billing
the government twice for the same mules, repainting rusted ships to sell them
as new, and selling gunpowder barrels filled with sawdust.48 The FCA was
adopted following “a series of sensational congressional investigations into
the sale of provisions and munitions to the War Department” that produced
hearings in which witnesses “painted a sordid picture of how the United
States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant
prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities
of war.”49 In response to this massive fraud, Congress imposed civil and
criminal liability for defrauding the government with significant penalties (at
the time, double damages, forfeiture, and up to five years’ imprisonment).50
Congress has since increased the FCA civil penalties to the point where
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See id. (discussing how the Stark Law is a strict liability statute where violation could
impose fines and create liability under the civil FCA as well).
47
Id.; 18 U.S.C.S. § 287 (LexisNexis 2021).
48
Carolyn J. Pashke, The Qui Tam Provision of the Federal False Claims Act: The Statute in
Current Form, its History and its Unique Position to Influence the Health Care Industry, 9 J.
L. HEALTH 163, 164, 186 (1994); Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136
S. Ct. 1989, 1996 (2016); Mark Pearlstein & Laura McLane , False Claims Act Overreach in
Healthcare: Patients Lose, WASH. EXAM’R (May 22, 2017, 12:04 AM),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/false-claims-act-overreach-in-healthcare-patientslose.
49
U.S. v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).
50
Universal Health Services, 136 S. Ct. at 1996.
43

Published by LAW eCommons,

7

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences, Vol. 31 [], Iss. 1, Art. 4

148

Annals of Health Law and Life Sciences

Vol. 31

liability is “essentially punitive in nature.”51 The FCA has become a
catastrophic piece of legislation for healthcare providers, as the HHS OIG
and DOJ have used the FCA to enforce issues that are well outside the
original intent of the legislation.52 In 2016, the DOJ announced that in the
preceding 8 years, it recovered $19.3 billion in healthcare fraud claims,
which was 57% of the total federal healthcare fraud recoveries made in the
past 30 years.53
1. Medical Necessity
A common theory of FCA liability for healthcare cases is lack of medical
necessity, which is ambiguous and generally not fraudulent, because the
procedures were actually performed and properly submitted.54 This is
problematic for providers, because the services in lack of medical necessity
cases were actually performed and in most cases call the physicians’ clinical
judgment into question through fraud allegations.55 Pursuing cases under this
theory is extremely troubling, because the issue is often a matter of judgment
on which reasonable, qualified physicians frequently differ.56 Consequently,
FCA cases devolve into a debate between the experts who disagree on the
central issue of patient need, which results in a flimsy concept of fraud that
largely depends on the persuasiveness of a party’s expert.57 There is much
at stake in these cases, as the provider is subject to potential liability over
three times the amount of the claims plus a maximum of $22,363 per claim.58
Stakes as high as these should be resolved in a manner that is much less
subjective and require much more intentional deceit and/or fraudulent
behavior from a provider.59
Medical necessity cases have continued to be brought frequently by the
government, with several cases making their way to the U.S. Court of
Appeals. Since 2018, four circuit court cases involving medical necessity
under the FCA have been decided: (1) United States of America ex rel.
Gerald Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital,60 (2) United States v. AseraCare,
51

Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 800 (2000).
Pearlstein & McLane, supra note 48.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28; 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2018) (showing the
maximum DOJ penalties for the False Claims Act at $22,363).
59
See Pearlstein & McLane, supra note 48 (discussing the overreach of the FCA and
potential FCA reform ideas).
60
U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark's Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 743 (10th Cir. 2018) (holding that
a doctor’s certification to the government that a procedure is ‘reasonable and necessary’ is
52
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Inc.,61 (3) United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives,62 and (4) Winter
ex rel. United States v. Gardens Regional Hospital and Medical Center.63
Clearly, this is not a novel issue of liability under the FCA—medical
necessity challenges are brought regularly by the government and
whistleblowers in an attempt to trigger FCA liability. Perhaps even more
troubling is the fact that these circuit cases are split as to whether this
difference of opinion is actionable under the FCA, calling into question
whether “objective falsity” should be the standard.64 Although this theory is
not codified in the FCA, practitioners and some circuits recognize it as a valid
theory that there must be objectively verifiable facts to prove that the claim
for medical services is false.65 This means that a physician’s good faith
clinical judgment may not be considered a false claim unless the judgment is
objectively invalid.66 If objective falsity is not necessary, a plaintiff can reach
a jury by finding an expert physician who disagrees with the treating
physician’s initial certification of medical necessity.67 Currently, the Third
and Ninth Circuits explicitly reject the “objective falsity” standard and the
Fourth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits adopt the “objective falsity”
standard.68 The other circuits have not explicitly ruled on this standard.69
Depending on which state you practice medicine in, you will be judged on a
different standard under a national law.70 Consequently, healthcare providers
have varying levels of FCA liability risk depending on in which state they

‘false’ under the FCA if the procedure was not reasonable and necessary under the
government’s definition of the phrase).
61
U.S. v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1294 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that the
physician’s clinical judgment dictates eligibility if it represents a reasonable interpretation of
the relevant medical records).
62
U.S. ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 100 (3rd Cir. 2020) (holding that a
difference of medical opinion is enough evidence to create a triable dispute of fact regarding
FCA falsity).
63
Winter ex rel. U.S. v. Gardens Reg’l Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Inc., 953 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2020) (holding that the FCA does not require a plaintiff to plead an ‘objective
falsehood.’).
64
Olivia R. King et al., Challenging Physician Judgement: Is your Institution Exposed to
False Claims Act Liability?, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 10, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/challenging-physician-judgment-your-institutionexposed-to-false-claims-act.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
See id. (discussing Circuit Courts’ disagreement regarding the objective falsity standard).
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practice.71 As an example, a healthcare practitioner in Pennsylvania would
be subject to potential FCA liability based on his or her medical judgment,
but the government must prove objective falsity before FCA liability can
attach to a similar practitioner in Florida.72
II. THE RELATOR
In addition to massive penalties, a lacking intent requirement, and
potential liability for services actually performed where medical necessity is
questioned, the incentive to bring FCA claims is heightened because civilians
are able to join in the government’s recovery.73 Lawsuits brought under the
FCA are typically called “qui tam” actions.74 Qui tam actions date back to
English common laws and the term is an abbreviation of the latin qui tam pro
domingo rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur. 75 This translates to
“who brings action for the king as well as himself”.76 Congress included a
qui tam provision in the FCA which entitles a relator share in the economic
recoveries of the government.77 Under 31 U.S. Code § 3730(b)(1), a person
may bring a civil action for a violation of the FCA and for the United States
Government.78 Persons bringing a civil action on behalf of the government
are called relators or whistleblowers.79 If the government proceeds with such
action, the person bringing the action is entitled to receive between 15 and
25 percent of the proceeds of the judgment or settlement of the claim based
upon the extent of their contribution to the prosecution of the case.80 If the
government decides not to intervene, the relator’s share is increased to 25 to
30 percent.81 Whistleblowers could be current or ex-business partners,
hospital or office staff, patients, or competitors.82 There can be a mixed
motive for bringing the qui tam lawsuit — revenge and financial gain in
The Supreme Court
addition to uncovering fraudulent activity.83
acknowledged this problem: “[q]ui tam relators are. . . motivated primarily

71

Id.
Id.
73
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
74
Pashke, supra note 48, at 164.
75
Id. at 165.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
79
The False Claims Act: A Primer, DEPT. OF JUSTICE 2 (last visited Aug. 07, 2021)
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/CFRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf; Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
80
31 U.S.C.§ 3730(d)(1).
81
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
82
Office of the Inspector General, supra note 28.
83
Sozio, supra note 1.
72
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by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.”84 Relators
have the potential to make millions of dollars if their qui tam case garners
recovery in the form of settlement or judgment, which greatly incentivizes
individuals to bring information forward.85 This can have a negative impact
because frivolous claims are likely to result as people chase the lucrative
rewards.86 Critics argue that the qui tam provisions of the FCA undermine
prosecutorial discretion by allowing private individuals to sue providers with
underlying allegations that the government has chosen not to pursue.87
Additionally, this forces the government to devote considerable resources to
review a staggering amount of qui tam filings.88
A. Current Enhanced Enforcement is Overbroad and Has Imposed a
Chilling Effect on Providers and Placed a Burden on the Healthcare
System
The combination of increased collaboration between various private and
public entities, the enhanced algorithmic fraud analysis tools, and the use of
FCA liability as the ultimate threat has led to the current state of overbroad
enforcement based on technical violations.89 This obscures the types of fraud
that should be investigated like billing for never performed procedures,
intentionally overbilling services, or performing risky procedures that are not
medically necessary.90 Real health care fraud exists in the United States;
however, it is not driving the majority of civil health care cases brought by
whistleblowers.91 Instead, counsel for whistleblowers scour healthcare
organizations to find individuals who can bring actions that are increasingly
about alleged failures to comply with the complexities of the Stark law and
AKS.92 This focus on technical violations stifles innovation, leads to fewer
physicians willing to take risks, reduces the amount of providers accepting

84

Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997).
See Sozio, supra note 1 (noting that whistleblowers have recovered millions of dollars due
to the overreach of the FCA).
86
Id.; Pashke, supra note 48.
87
Joan H. Krause, Promises to Keep: Health Care Providers and the Civil False Claims Act,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1414 (2002).
88
Id.
89
CMS Newsroom, supra note 8.
90
Sozio, supra note 1.
91
Id.
92
Id.
85
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public insurance, and leads to undertreatment due to fear of FCA liability.93
Providers are not the only ones who suffer from such a rigorous enforcement
regime.94 These massive recoveries—especially in cases where there was no
actual fraud—drive up the overall costs of healthcare.95 Moreover, many
targets of these investigations serve some of the neediest, publicly-insured
patients for whom access to care is otherwise limited or nonexistent.96
There are indications that prosecutorial overreaching occurs in healthcare
fraud and abuse investigations, where investigations tend to take on a life of
their own and seek out violations where there are none.97 Prosecutors have
put unnecessary pressure on providers to settle cases brought under the FCA,
expanding its scope in the process.98 Providers faced with the enormous
potential liability under the FCA are convinced to settle these allegations for
more reasonable sums in exchange for not being excluded from the federal
healthcare reimbursement program.99 In fact, most healthcare FCA disputes
are resolved via settlement in lieu of a trial.100 On its face, this may seem
like a good outcome for all parties as the government receives compensation
and the providers are permitted to continue participating in the
However, these settlements have a
Medicare/Medicaid program.101
deleterious impact on the healthcare fraud and abuse regime by removing
critical legal issues from the courtroom. It also leaves providers with little
guidance to decipher a murky gray area.102
Prosecutorial overreach is evident in the case of Stephen Bernard Kuper,
the owner of Dandy Drug in Burleson, Texas, who was charged with paying
kickbacks to a marketing group in an effort to attract prescription referrals.103
He had a relationship with the fraudulent marketing company for only 80
days with little contact or communication with those who pled guilty.104 In
one of the rare cases where a healthcare fraud and abuse case goes to trial,
Stephen Kuper was found not guilty by a Texas jury.105 Notwithstanding the

93
Jonathan W. Emord, Murder by Medicare: The Demise of Solo and Small Group Medical
Practices, 21 REGULATION 31, 38–39 (1998).
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non-guilty verdict, Kuper’s life has been forever upended by the years-long
prosecution — his drugstore went out of business, and he is unable to find
employment as a pharmacist due to the taint from his association with the
fraud case.106 This case is emblematic of the negative impact that
overzealous prosecution of healthcare fraud and abuse has on providers.107
The case of Dr. Krishan Kumar Aggarwal and Dr. Cherian John
demonstrates how innocent physicians can be swept up as part of a larger
investigation.108 The West Virginia opioid addiction treatment physicians
were implicated in the indictment of Redirections Treatment Advocates for
alleged unlawful prescription of Suboxone.109 After a nine-day trial and eight
hours of deliberation, the jury acquitted both Dr. Aggarwal and Dr. John.110
Both physicians worked with Redirections only a few days per week.111
There appeared to be a lack of evidence that the doctors were guilty of
improper conduct and both doctors were acquitted on all charges.112 While
there was evidence of wrongdoing by Redirections (the founder and owner
pled guilty), these doctors did nothing wrong; however, they were subject to
extensive investigation, and operational and reputational cost.113
The case of Dr. Pramela Ganji also presents an innocent healthcare
provider being implicated as part of a broader healthcare prosecution.114 Dr.
Ganji was a medical director for Christian Home Health Care (Christian), a
106
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Charged with Unlawfully Distrib. Buprenorphine and Defrauding Medicare and Medicaid,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. OFF. PUB. AFFS. JUST. NEWS (May 3, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/five-pennsylvania-physicians-charged-unlawfullydistributing-buprenorphine-and-defrauding.
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See Aziz Habuffa, Drs. Krishan Kumar Aggarwal and Cherian John Cleared of All
Charges in Opioid Case, India Abroad (Last updated Jul 2, 2019),
https://www.indiaabroad.com/indian-americans/drs-krishan-kumar-aggarwal-and-cherianjohn-cleared-of-all-charges-in-opioid-case/article_2ef7ef56-97a2-11e9-987cf7fd6db91888.html (“Appearing with their attorneys after the jury verdict was rendered,
both physicians said it was a ‘horrible process’ to go through and that their lives and that of
their families had been made ‘miserable’ and also prevented them from treating their
patients, many of whom they had been taking care of for years.”).
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See United States v. Ganji, 880 F.3d 760, 778 (5th Cir. 2018) (reversing Dr. Ganji’s
guilty verdict for conspiracy to commit health care fraud and health care fraud).
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home health care services company in New Orleans.115 She was a physician
who owned a private practice that worked closely with nurse practitioners
who treated homebound patients through face-to-face encounters.116 The
investigation revealed that the Christian scheme paid incentives to its
employees for referring eligible Medicare patients to its home health
services, even when the patients were not clinically appropriate for home
care.117 Some of Christian’s medical directors would authorize a patient’s
homebound status without clinical review to bill Medicare for home care
services.118 Without evidence of actual wrongdoing, Dr. Ganji was convicted
of two counts of fraud, sentenced to seventy-two months’ imprisonment, and
ordered to pay Medicare $5 million in restitution.119 The 5th Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals overturned the conviction because the evidence presented
by the Government did not support a conviction for fraud and did not prove
any malfeasance by Dr. Ganji.120 Here, the Government relied on a theory
of guilt by association which relied solely on inferences—since other
Christian medical directors in other Louisiana clinics engaged in fraudulent
practices, Dr. Ganji must have similarly committed fraud.121 Yet, the trial
record indicated the opposite—it was clear that Dr. Ganji conducted her
practice differently than other Christian medical directors.122 Cases like these
are cautionary tales to providers who are wary about being implicated in
overbroad investigations where the government casts a wide net in an effort
to capture all of the bad actors, while simultaneously sweeping up innocent
providers.
III. EXAMPLES OF CURRENT FRAUD AND ABUSE DOJ SHOULD TARGET
As demonstrated, the current DOJ enforcement regime is a tidal wave of
enforcement that oftentimes swallows healthcare providers who are
attempting to make an honest living.123 This regime has grown exponentially
over the past decade and seems to lack focus on the most sensible areas of
investigation — intentional fraud that costs taxpayers money and harms
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patients.124 This is evidenced by the fact that the number of cases brought by
a whistleblower jumped from around 200 per year in the early 2000s to more
than 400 per year since 2011.125 In order to better understand what types of
healthcare fraud and abuse the DOJ should focus its efforts on, this article
will present three glaring examples — (1) pass-through laboratory testing in
rural areas, (2) Medicare Advantage fraud, and (3) medically unnecessary
procedures posing serious risks to patients. These examples are egregious
because they prove malintent and do great harm to our healthcare system.
A. Pass-through Labs
A pernicious and increasingly popular healthcare scheme that raises fraud
concerns is pass-through billing for testing in hospital laboratories.126 To
understand why laboratory testing might present an opportunity to defraud,
it is important to note that many providers of healthcare services in rural areas
are reimbursed at a higher rate in order to incentivize the provision of care in
traditionally underserved areas.127 These higher rates create an opportunity
for outside companies to take advantage, and indeed these companies
specifically target rural facilities in order to benefit from the higher
reimbursement.128
1. Overview of the Pass-Through Billing Arrangement
Pass-through billing arrangements are identified where laboratory testing
claims are billed by a different entity than the performing entity.129 This
billing arrangement is also referred to as account billing or client billing.130
This model has been used for years.131 In this model, the provider purchases
laboratory services at a discount, marks up the price and subsequently rebills
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the purchased services to patients and insurance companies.132 In some
cases, it is permissible to do this as a reference laboratory arrangement, but
in other instances, insurance company policies, federal law, or state laws may
prohibit this type of arrangement.133
2. The Rural Fraudulent Pass-Through Billing Scheme
In the last several years, a new form of pass-through billing has been
introduced by management companies to hospital laboratories.134 The rural
pass-through fraudulent billing scheme typically arises following an
acquisition or when a newly established management agreement with a
struggling rural hospital is formed.135 Private consulting companies,
typically from out of state, will approach rural facilities and offer to set up a
laboratory or use their existing laboratory to provide testing services.136 It is
marketed to the rural facilities as a legitimate method to process laboratory
tests and these facilities, which are usually in financial distress, agree to
accept either partial ownership in the laboratory or receive kickbacks from
the consulting company.137 The purpose of the arrangement with a rural
hospital is to take advantage of its payor agreements, which yield a higher
reimbursement.138 Also, the hospital enjoys a large increase in its laboratory
revenue and market share.139 This appears to be a win-win for both parties;
however, as later explained, this can be severely problematic for the hospital
and can lead to disastrous consequences.140
After formalizing the arrangement with the rural hospital, the out-of-state
consulting company then exploits its control over the rural facility by sending
samples collected in non-rural facilities to the laboratory in order to process
and bill insurance companies at significantly higher reimbursement rates.141
An alternative means of exploiting this relationship is collecting and testing
132
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specimens in non-rural laboratories, and billing them as though they were
conducted and tested in the rural laboratory.142 Finally, in the most egregious
example of the fraudulent rural pass-through billing scheme, the management
company bills samples not tested at all as if they were collected and tested in
the rural facility in order to get paid handsomely by public and private
insurance companies.143
In addition to artificially increasing the cost of healthcare, this scheme can
also harm patients who have out-of-pocket expenses, which are significantly
rising in recent years.144 These patients are forced to pay more out of pocket,
solely for the pecuniary gain of these management companies.145 These
management companies also pay kickbacks to physicians in order to
incentivize them to refer additional laboratory testing.146 This can lead to
overutilization through the ordering of medically unnecessary laboratory
tests.147 In order to facilitate this scheme, these hospital laboratories are used
as fronts to hide the identity of the management company performing the
tests.148 This is accomplished by placing the hospital’s Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Amendments (CLIA) number on the lab report instead of the
management company lab, which is responsible for conducting the tests.149
3. Pass-Through Billing is Illegal, Fraudulent, and Unethical
As previously explained, pass-through billing arrangements are a
seemingly great way for a hospital or clinic to increase revenue without
increasing overhead; however, there are multiple reasons why this
arrangement is illegal, unethical, and fraudulent.150 Pass-through billing is
illegal because the contractor, and not the billing entity, performed the
service.151 There are several healthcare fraud and abuse statutes implicated
by this arrangement, which will be addressed individually. In addition to
142
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these legal issues, there are also regulatory consequences to consider.152
Finally, there are serious ethical problems associated with pass-through
billing.153
Pass-through billing arrangements can violate the AKS in several ways.
The revenue split between the laboratory performing the service or the
laboratory management company and the hospital may be considered an
inducement for referrals from the laboratory/management company.154
Essentially, the hospital’s revenue split with the performing
laboratory/management company is a payment for the referral of specimens
to the hospital so that it can bill for those laboratory services (even though it
did not collect or analyze them).155 The AKS can be implicated if ordering
providers receive remuneration to induce them to refer testing services to the
laboratory that are reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid.156
Pass-through billing arrangements could violate Stark if a physician refers
services to a laboratory that will share a portion of the revenue received for
those services with the referring physician.157 A common element of passthrough billing schemes involves paying bonuses or monthly dividends to
doctors who send a high volume of specimens to the laboratories.158 Passthrough billing is fraudulent because the actual cost of the service is the
amount that is paid to the contracting laboratory/management company, not
the marked-up price billed by the hospital.159 This type of arrangement
would consequently be a violation of the FCA, since the hospital is
knowingly presenting a false and fraudulent claim for payment.160 There are
other FCA implications (e.g., AKS violations which trigger FCA liability),
especially in schemes wherein physicians are paid kickbacks and/or bonuses
based on the volume of specimens they refer to the laboratories.161 In
addition to the federal FCA, many states have their own equivalent of the
FCA, which render these types of claims to private payers fraudulent.162 Not
only is the scheme itself a violation of the FCA, but if providers refer testing
152
See Cooper, supra note 11 (giving examples of regulatory consequences including breach
of hospital-payor contracts and increased risk of recoupment claims against unsuspecting
hospitals).
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in cases where it is not medically necessary in order to profit from the
scheme, such claims would be considered false claims and violate federal and
applicable state FCA laws.163
Considering the potentially devastating consequences of violating federal
AKS, Stark, and FCA laws, many of these pass-through billing schemes
specifically exclude services reimbursable by government payers (i.e.,
Medicare, Medicaid, Tricare, and commercial Medicare Advantage plans).164
As mentioned above, most states have their own Stark, AKS, and FCA
equivalent laws that apply these schemes to private payors.165
In addition to the Stark, AKS, and FCA equivalent state laws, many states
also have statutory restrictions on pass-through billing and markup.166
Generally, there are four types of state regulatory regimes relevant to the
pass-through billing scheme: (1) direct billing, (2) anti-markup, (3)
disclosure, and (4) unregulated.167 In states that implement the direct billing
regulatory regime, laboratories must bill payers directly for the services they
perform; therefore, in these states, the pass-through billing scheme would be
illegal.168 Other states have an anti-markup regulatory regime wherein a
provider that purchases laboratory services is prohibited from “marking up”
the cost of services to a price that exceeds what was paid to the laboratory.169
Anti-markup states prohibit hospitals from charging payors and patients a
higher rate for laboratory services than it pays to the laboratory; effectively
making it legally impossible to engage in the pass-through billing scheme.170
Some states require a disclosure from the purchaser indicating which
laboratory it purchased services from at what cost and if there was a
markup.171 This combats a critical component of the pass-through billing
scheme — anonymity for the management company laboratories that
actually perform the testing.172 The fourth and final type of state regulatory
regime is those states that are completely devoid of statutory prohibitions on
markup or billing for purchased services.173 In these states, pass-through
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laboratory billing is not illegal under state law; however, the perpetrators of
these schemes can still run into problems with the insurance payer.
While there may be no specific prohibition from state or federal law to
engage in this laboratory pass-through billing scheme in unregulated states,
this behavior can violate national commercial health insurance provider
contracts.174 The hospital is most likely bound contractually by the insurance
company to bill only for services it actually performs.175 Consequently, the
hospital would be in breach of its payer contract if it bills for services
performed by the management company laboratory, which would render it a
false claim under applicable state law.176 Moreover, the hospital could
potentially lose its contract with the private insurance companies, which
would be a huge operational hurdle and render terrible outcomes for the
insurance company’s enrollees, who would no longer be able to utilize their
preferred hospital.
The pass-through billing scheme is unethical for several reasons. Under
the American Medical Association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics Opinion
11.3.1, physicians should “charge only for the service(s) that are personally
rendered or for services performed under the physician’s direct personal
observation, direction or supervision.”177 Physicians must not charge
excessive fees, or “charge a markup or commission, or profit on services
rendered by other healthcare professionals.”178 Physicians must also “itemize
separately charges for diagnostic, laboratory, or clinical services provided by
other health care professionals.”179 It is also unethical to accept kickbacks

174
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and refer patients for services on the basis of financial gain.180 Furthermore,
it is unethical to subject patients to unnecessary testing, especially when
physicians stand to benefit financially.181 When hospitals conduct passthrough billing they violate ethical principles – often billing for medically
unnecessary services that are not under their supervision, and charging
markups and excessive fees by funneling the charges through the laboratory
or management company.182
Perhaps the worst aspect of the pass-through scheme for a rural hospital
that desperately agrees to this arrangement in the hopes of keeping its lights
on, is that the “hospital will be directly liable for any recoupment claim
successfully brought” by a harmed payor.183 These hospitals are vulnerable
to liability because they are the entities that submitted the claims for the
services in question and have the contractual agreements and obligations with
payors.184 If the claims are submitted to federal programs, the hospitals and
their physicians will be subject to penalties under the federal and/or state
FCA and Stark laws.185 The masterminds behind the scheme –the
management companies – are largely insulated from liability for recoupment
action based on increasingly popular legal theories such as medical
necessity.186
4. Current Examples of the Pass-Through Billing Scheme
Having explored the fundamental components of the fraudulent passthrough billing scheme, the article now proceeds to discuss several examples
that demonstrate elements of this scheme and describe the overwhelming
financial impact it has on the healthcare industry. The HFPP set forth an
example where a 15-bed Missouri hospital received nearly $90 million in
payments for laboratory services ordered in other facilities in the U.S.187
Another example recounted to the HFPP involved a lab in urban
Philadelphia, which treated hundreds of lab orders billed as having been
180
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processed in a laboratory in rural Kansas.188 These examples are just the tip
of the iceberg, as more of these fraudulent schemes are being uncovered. Not
only are these schemes becoming increasingly popular, but the egregiousness
of the abuse is staggering. Stamford Memorial Hospital in Stamford, Texas
was nearing bankruptcy until it hired outside “consulting help.”189 In 2016,
one year after the consulting firm was hired, Stamford Memorial Hospital’s
outpatient lab test charges increased by 10,926% to nearly $70 million from
approximately $632,000 in the prior year.190 This increase was not due to
sudden population growth and/or a higher need for healthcare services in
Stamford. Rather, this influx of outpatient lab test overall charges soared
from 11% in 2015 to 93% of its total charges in 2016.191 This was an
abnormality attributed to the processing of specimens from outside
facilities.192
On June 29, 2020, the DOJ filed an indictment in the middle district of
Florida against ten individuals residing in Florida, Illinois, and Georgia for
participating in an elaborate pass-through billing scheme repurposing rural
hospitals as billing shells to submit fraudulent claims for laboratory testing
between November 2015 and February 2018.193 The conspirators billed
private insurance companies approximately $1.4 billion for fraudulent
laboratory testing claims and were paid approximately $400 million.194 The
indictment outlines the fraudulent scheme where the conspirators would take
over small, rural hospitals, which were often in financial trouble through
management companies that they owned and operated.195 They then would
bill private insurance companies using these rural hospitals for millions of
dollars of expensive urinalysis drug tests and blood tests, most of which were
performed at non-rural external laboratories controlled by the management
company.196 These tests would consequently be reimbursed at significantly
higher rates than if billed through the entity of the laboratory where they
actually were performed.197 The rural hospitals were essentially used as a
shell to multiply the payments to the management company.198 To make
188

Id.
Tara Bannow, Hospital Lab Charge Spikes Found at Rural Hospitals, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, (Jun. 23, 2018 1:00 AM),
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20180623/NEWS/180629980/hospital-labcharge-spikes-found-at-rural-hospitals (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
US D.O.J., supra note 135.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Id.
189

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol31/iss1/4

22

Filippello: Healthcare Fraud Investigations: Overview of Overbroad Investigat

2022

Healthcare Fraud Investigations

163

matters worse, the indictment alleges that in addition to achieving a
fraudulent multiplier to their bill, many tests passed through to rural hospitals
were not medically necessary and were obtained through offering kickbacks
to recruiters and healthcare providers at sober living houses and substance
abuse treatment centers.199 These kickbacks further the scheme in a way that
implicates other types of illegality that is criminal in nature. Speaking of
criminal conduct, the conspirators in this case also engaged in a sophisticated
money-laundering effort to hide the scheme and distribute the fraudulent
proceeds without detection.200 These added layers of criminality go towards
the mens rea of these providers and outside consultants; they knew what they
were doing was not only illegal, but wrong, and proceeded to bill anyway.
A rural pass-through billing scheme that encapsulates almost every aspect
of the typical scheme is featured in the lawsuit Aetna, Inc. v. People’s Choice
Hospital, LLC. On September 29, 2017, Aetna filed a lawsuit against
People’s Choice Hospital (PCH), formerly known as Newman Memorial
Hospital (Newman), a twenty-five bed critical access hospital in Shattuck,
Oklahoma along with eight affiliated clinical laboratories or laboratory
management companies, two physicians, and two individual owners or
executives.201 The PCH pass-through laboratory scheme was textbook
because 1) an outside management company (PCH) gained control over a
financially struggling hospital (Newman); 2) the management company
dramatically increased the volume of laboratory testing; 3) by billing for
specimens that were collected off-site from patients who had no relation to
the hospital and were never sent to the hospital for analysis; 4) the name of
the performing laboratory (PCH or affiliates) appeared nowhere on the
claims; 5) in order to be reimbursed at a substantially higher rate; 6) the
management company and/or affiliated labs incented physicians to refer
specimens to the PCH labs by paying kickbacks and other financial
incentives; and 7) all while breaching the participation agreement with the
insurance payer.202
In its complaint, Aetna alleged that typical reimbursements for rural
hospitals like Newman occurred at a higher rate to ensure that its rural
patients — who have minimal access to medical facilities — are able to get
care from qualified professionals.203 Aetna argued that a claim for specific
199
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lab services submitted by Newman might be reimbursed at a rate of $2,250,
in comparison to the same services billed by a national laboratory (such as
PCH or affiliates) reimbursed at a rate of $120.204 In order to enjoy the vastly
higher reimbursement, PCH gained control over the management,
operations, and finances of Newman in 2016.205 After gaining this control,
it entered Newman into various agreements with labs and billing entities that
would use their relationships with physicians across the United States to
obtain and collect blood and urine samples that needed to be tested.206 The
PCH labs and management companies also offered incentivizing payments
to physicians to refer patients to PCH labs.207 From 2013 to 2015, Newman
submitted around 6 laboratory claims per month and was paid an average of
$91,000 per year.208 In the period from January 2016 to April 2017—after
PCH took control over Newman—Newman submitted a staggering 834
laboratory claims per month and was paid more than $21 million in claims.209
Regardless of where the sample was collected or analyzed, the PCH labs and
billing entities would submit claim forms to Aetna with Newman’s name and
billing information in order to receive payment as an “in-network” provider
at the much higher reimbursement rates under the Aetna-Newman
contract.210 PCH received reimbursement at the higher Newman rate for
testing of specimens from patients all around the country with no relation to
Newman.211 This resulted in an explosion of claims for laboratory services
submitted by Newman.212
These rural pass-through billing schemes have a ripple effect throughout
the entire healthcare industry. There is a strong likelihood that time-sensitive
laboratory results are delayed and/or contaminated during the transport to
rural areas.213 The rural hospitals that participate in these schemes will likely
go bankrupt in light of severe financial penalties arising from participation in
these fraudulent schemes.214 Furthermore, the healthcare system is
unnecessarily overburdened by diverting hundreds of millions of dollars
from insurance companies and the federal government and lining the pockets
of business people who are perpetrating these fraudulent schemes.
Moreover, patients ultimately suffer harm as rural providers are forced to
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close or limit their available services to stave off bankruptcy.215 These
fraudulent pass-through billing schemes are exactly the type of fraud the DOJ
should be investigating. While there are many examples of prosecutions and
settlements with these bad actors, there are many more draining the
government and insurance companies of money and filling their bank
accounts with unjustly obtained riches.216 These are not technical violations
of Stark or AKS — they are intentional and egregious money grabs that are
detrimental to both patients and taxpayers.
B. Medicare Advantage Fraud
Another egregious example of Medicare fraud that the OIG should further
investigate is perpetrated by insurance companies, not individual providers
or participants in federal healthcare reimbursement programs. These
programs cost the government billions of dollars annually by artificially
inflating the patient risk scores effectively garnering higher payouts for their
Medicare Advantage patients. This fraudulent plan involves paying
providers to complete forms that require anecdotal healthcare data which, in
turn, artificially enhance federal reimbursement payments to the insurance
companies.217
1. Overview of Vulnerability of Medicare Advantage Program
Over 23 million Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare
Advantage (MA) plans, administered by Medicare Advantage Organizations
(MAOs), at an annual cost to the government of over $264 billion.218 Under
MA, Part C of the Medicare program, MAOs contract with private insurers
to provide Parts A and B services to Medicare recipients in lieu of the
traditional fee-for-service Medicare plan.219 MAOs receive a monthly
capitation payment for each Medicare beneficiary enrolled in their MA plans,
215
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which reflects CMS’ predicted cost of care for that beneficiary.220 CMS riskadjusts its payments to MAOs and pays more for Medicare beneficiaries who
have higher expected costs of healthcare.221 CMS adjusts these payments
based on the MA beneficiary’s risk, which is determined by demographic
information and diagnoses from the prior year.222 This risk-adjustment starts
with an encounter or the receipt of medical items from a provider by the MA
beneficiary.223 The provider submits a bill to the MAO, and the MAO then
submits a record of the service to CMS’s encounter data system with claims
information and diagnoses.224
In addition to reporting diagnoses to CMS with service records from
providers, MAOs may also perform chart reviews of the MA beneficiary’s
medical record to identify diagnoses that providers did not originally submit,
or erroneously submitted to the MAO.225 MAOs then report diagnoses
identified by these chart reviews to CMS, which makes a risk adjustment —
often resulting in an increased capitation payment for the MA beneficiary.226
The HHS OIG performed a study in 2019, based on 2016 MA encounter data,
to determine the financial impact of diagnoses reported on chart reviews and
not on a service record in the encounter data from that year.227 Based on this
analysis, it found that MAOs almost always used chart reviews as a tool to
add, rather than to delete diagnoses.228 Perhaps unsurprisingly, MAOs added
diagnoses in over 99% of chart reviews, resulting in an estimated $6.7 billion
in risk-adjusted payments for the following calendar year.229 In 2016, CMS
made an estimated $2.7 billion in risk-adjusted payments on chart review
diagnoses that were not linked to a specific service provided to the
beneficiary, let alone a face to face encounter.230 Almost half of MAOs had
payments from chart reviews where there was not a single record of a service
provided to the MA beneficiary.231 There are three alarming concerns with
these findings: (1) a data integrity concern that MAOs are not submitting all
service records as they are required to do, (2) a payment integrity concern
with the risk-adjusted payments if diagnoses are inaccurate and/or
unsupported rendering them superfluous and inappropriate, and (3) a quality
of care concern that MA beneficiaries are not receiving needed services for
220
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potentially serious diagnoses listed on chart reviews without service
records.232 As evidenced from the following examples, the unfortunate truth
is that the most likely explanation for these discrepancies is a payment
concern; with MAOs manipulating the diagnoses to ratchet up the perceived
risk of their MA beneficiaries in order to line their pockets with risk-adjusted
payments.233 Some MAOs are alleged to incentivize their in-network
participating primary care providers, through significant sums, to attend
training seminars and complete assessments that ultimately enhance the risk
scores of their MA beneficiaries.234
2. Examples of Medicare Advantage Fraud
The first example of MA fraud is from the biggest health insurance
company in the United States, UnitedHealthcare.235 In 2017 there were two
cases, within two weeks of each other, in which the United States intervened
against UnitedHealthcare involving Medicare Advantage Fraud.236 In both
cases, the Government alleged that UnitedHealthcare knowingly obtained
inflated risk adjustment payments based on untruthful and inaccurate
information concerning the health of its beneficiaries enrolled in its MA
plans.237 In the first case, UnitedHealthcare funded chart reviews conducted
by providers in order to increase the risk adjustment payments received from
Medicare for those beneficiaries; however, it disregarded information from
these chart reviews about invalid diagnoses and consequently avoided
recoupment of monies by Medicare.238 In the second case, UnitedHealthcare
232
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similarly conducted a national Chart Review Program, which was intended
to identify additional diagnoses not previously reported by providers.239 This
increased its risk adjustment payments, while simultaneously ignoring
information from these chart reviews showing thousands of diagnoses
previously submitted by the providers not supporting the Medicare payments
UnitedHealthcare had received.240 Not only did UnitedHealthcare knowingly
submit false diagnoses and overlook previously submitted false diagnoses,
but it also paid providers to furnish such diagnoses.241 UnitedHealthcare tied
these provider payments to the amount of risk adjusted payments received
from Medicare.242 Therefore, the providers benefitted from the diagnoses
they provided and were thus incentivized to report invalid diagnoses.243
UnitedHealthcare allegedly knew these incentives existed.244 In a review
performed by them, UnitedHealthcare discovered that the providers had
reported invalid diagnoses, yet they avoided any further efforts to identify
more invalid diagnoses and subsequent repayment of monies to Medicare.245
If the biggest health insurance company engaged in this type of MA fraud,
then it is likely that most health insurance companies are engaged in this
behavior as well. It turns out that several health insurance companies have
been busted for similar activity in recent months.246 ANTHEM, one of the
nation’s largest MAOs, paid a vendor named Med-Connect to collect medical
records from providers and conduct a thorough review to identify all
diagnoses supported by these records.247 ANTHEM used these additional
diagnoses to augment the record previously submitted to Medicare.248
Similar to the way UnitedHealthcare treated these reviews, ANTHEM never
deleted or attempted to verify unsubstantiated diagnoses, it would only add
diagnoses it found.249 It is also alleged that Cigna’s MA plan, called
HealthSpring, engaged in this type of fraud since 2012, through its “360
Program”.250 Cigna executives designed so-called 360 forms to collect both
clinical data and anecdotal health information without requiring providers to
239
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specify what type of information it was providing.251 Despite knowing this
issue with the program, executives paid primary care doctors $150 per
completed health assessment and $1,000 to attend training seminars.252 The
purpose of these forms is obvious—Cigna used this information to create
diagnoses that it could submit to Medicare to inflate its risk-adjusted
payments and compensated its providers to source this information.253 While
the Government declined to intervene in this suit, it is clearly yet another
example of a health insurance company taking advantage of Medicare.254
The last, but certainly not least, example of MA fraud uncovered by the
HHS OIG was allegedly perpetrated by Humana, another Fortune 500 health
insurance company.255 The HHS OIG selected a sample of 200 MA
beneficiaries with at least one diagnosis code leading to an increased riskadjusted payment for the year 2015 and provided this data to a medical
review contractor.256 Of the 1,525 codes analyzed, 203 were not validated
by the medical review contractor.257 From the 203 unvalidated diagnoses,
OIG estimated that there was $197.7 million spent in overpayments to
Humana for 2015.258 The HHS OIG recommended that Humana refund the
federal government this overpayment and enhance its policies and
procedures to better “prevent, detect, and correct” unvalidated diagnoses
submitted to Medicare that are used to calculate risk-adjusted payments.259
According to the HHS assistant regional inspector general, Christopher
Bresette, if the recommendation to repay the $197.7 million was finalized, it
would have been “by far the largest” audit penalty ever imposed on a MA
company.260 As demonstrated by this Humana example and the others
previously discussed, it is clear that this type of MA fraud is pervasive across
the industry and has been going on for a long time relatively unchecked by
251
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the HHS OIG. Therefore, it is imperative that the HHS OIG conduct more
audits like these and investigate programs like Cigna’s 360 Program to
significantly reduce fraudulent risk-adjusted payments that drain the
Medicare program of valuable funds. In fact, it appears that the HHS OIG is
focusing its efforts on MA fraud, conducting additional audits of the MA
reimbursements of Kaiser Permanente and Aetna; however, this is just the tip
of the iceberg, and more efforts must be undertaken to curb this area of fraud
and abuse.261
C. Unnecessary Procedures that Can Lead to Bad Patient Outcomes
Some providers engage in pernicious fraud to enrich themselves and put
their patients at risk of dangerous complications with unnecessary
procedures. One such case involves Dr. Mark Midei of St. Joseph Medical
Center in Towson, Maryland.262 Dr. Mark Midei put at least 273 patients
through unnecessary heart stent procedures and falsely billed federal
healthcare programs for them.263 This was an extremely dangerous means of
defrauding the government.264
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Another example of similarly dangerous healthcare fraud for financial
gain was carried out by Dr. Jorge Zamora-Quezada.265 Dr. Zamora-Quezada
was a rheumatologist in Texas who was found guilty of falsely diagnosing
patients with life-long diseases and treating them with toxic medications such
as chemotherapy.266 The overarching scheme totaled $325 million.267
In an especially egregious case, the fraudulent conduct of Dr. Rezik Saqer,
an anesthesiologist with Texas Pain Solutions and Integra Medical Clinic,
even led to patient deaths.268 Dr. Saqer pled guilty to health care fraud and
was ordered to pay $5 million in restitution; he was accused of “luring
vulnerable patients to his clinics by prescribing powerful opioid narcotics,
and then requiring the patients to submit to unnecessary and dangerous
procedures and tests, which were often performed by Saqer’s unlicensed staff
and fraudulently billed to healthcare insurers.”269 His fraudulent scheme
totaled $14 million in overpayments and was responsible for multiple
overdose deaths, as well as the death of a young family when one of his
patients, who was under the influence of Dr. Saqer’s illegally-prescribed
narcotics, killed them in an auto accident.270 These cases are obviously the
worst types of healthcare fraud and abuse and are rightly targeted in an
aggressive fashion by the OIG and must continue to be a focus for the antifraud divisions.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS ON HEALTHCARE FRAUD INVESTIGATION
REFORM
As demonstrated throughout this paper, the current HHS OIG enforcement
regime does well in recouping monies for the federal government and
deterring fraud and abuse through threat of prosecution by the DOJ.
265
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However, it would benefit from refocusing its efforts to better target areas
that need to be investigated to lessen the threat against innocent providers.
To effectively reduce fraud and abuse, the government should focus its
efforts on schemes such as pass-through blood labs, Medicare Advantage risk
score inflation and provider incentive regimes, and risky yet medically
unnecessary procedures, testing and pharmaceutical administration. These
types of schemes are created to specifically defraud the government by
inflating reimbursement rates or billing for services that did not occur (or
were not performed legally). In the worst cases, these schemes harm patients.
These are precisely the types of fraud and abuse the government should be
singularly focused against. In my view, there are several steps the
government can take to better focus its approach to fraud and abuse
investigations and prosecution. The federal government should (1) consider
the negative impact that the fraudulent schemes have on patients and attempt
to make them whole, (2) focus on the intent of the providers when
considering wrongdoing, (3) greatly modify the FCA to focus on provider
intent and actual false claims, and (4) target its resources to go after the bad
actors doing considerable harm and disproportionately costing the
government incredible sums of money. Together, these four philosophical
and procedural changes should refine the government’s enforcement tools
from an overbroad fishing expedition into a targeted probe into nefarious
actors in the healthcare industry who harm patients and cost taxpayers
billions of dollars.
A. Patient-Centered Approach
An often overlooked aspect of fraud and abuse in the healthcare sector is
the actual harm caused to patients physically, financially, and intangibly.271
According to a study, patients treated by healthcare professionals who were
subsequently excluded from the Medicare program due to their role in fraud
and abuse were fourteen to seventeen percent more likely to die than similar
patients treated by non-excluded healthcare providers.272 The Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health study estimated that healthcare fraud and
abuse contributed to 6,700 premature deaths in 2013 alone.273 Furthermore,
healthcare fraud and abuse causes financial injuries to patients due to the
cost-sharing structure of the federal healthcare programs (for example,
271
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patients are responsible for 20% of the cost of outpatient services in Medicare
Part B).274 Additionally, patients often suffer intangible harm in the form of
misuse of patient data to obtain reimbursement for services not performed.275
Collectively, this damage to patients is considerable and often unaddressed
by fraud and abuse enforcement efforts.276
Current health care fraud recovery is not patient-centered because patients
are not viewed as the victims of the fraud; rather, the federal government is
viewed as the victim.277 The federal government should take a patientcentered approach, focusing on cases in which patients suffer physical,
financial, or intangible harm.278 In addition to focusing investigations on
patient harm, Congress should amend federal law to allow for direct or
indirect compensation of injured patients for out-of-pocket expenses or
incorporating consumer protection remedies within settlements with
perpetrating providers.279 This will enable patients—often the true victims
of fraud and abuse—to share in the recovery and be made whole.280
B. Focus on Intent
Another area of focus for the HHS OIG should be on the intent of the
physicians to defraud or pose risk to their patients. The focus of federal
investigators should be on healthcare providers who are knowingly harming
patients or deceiving the government for pecuniary gain. The pass-through
lab schemes and the unnecessary invasive procedures discussed supra are two
examples of providers’ egregious and intentional conduct. Many providers
may accidentally run afoul of the complex AKS and Stark statutes even after
seeking the advice of counsel. Due to this complexity, the government
should not focus on technical violations subjecting providers to crippling
penalties or barring them from participation in Medicare.281 Rather they
should focus on bad actors who are intentionally deceiving the government
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in order to enrich themselves, oftentimes harming patients and the healthcare
system as a whole.
C. FCA Reforms
In an effort to focus on intent and hone in on cases of actual fraud, there
are several ways to improve the FCA to lessen the burden on providers while
simultaneously rooting out fraud and abuse: (1) remove FCA liability for
claims that are actually performed, but technically violate Stark or AKS, or
prosecute only willful violations instead of violations which are merely
reckless, (2) damages should be calculated according to actual loss, instead
of gross reimbursement, (3) federalize objective falsity for medical necessity,
and (4) reduce recovery for whistleblowers to a flat/hourly rate or a
significantly reduced percentage.282
A claim should not be considered “false” if it was duly performed
according to medical and coding guidelines—that is, government
enforcement should remain faithful to the plain meaning of “false claims.”
In this regard, a technical violation of Stark or AKS should not make a duly
rendered service a “false claim” for purposes of the FCA, thus subjecting the
providers to treble damages. However, under the implied certification theory
adopted by the United States Supreme Court, any violation of Stark or AKS
can become a false claim under the FCA if the provider in violation submits
a claim for reimbursement to a federal healthcare program.283 This should be
changed by statute, because it is subjecting providers to debilitating damages
for claims that do not actually defraud the government of money in the way
the FCA was intended to prevent against. Alternatively, the FCA should
punish only willful violations of the law to avoid honest mistakes being
subject to treble damages.284 Honest mistakes and misunderstandings are
currently characterized as reckless in order for the federal government to
avail itself of the treble damages mechanism in the FCA.285 This should not
be an available remedy for conduct that was not intentional.
If the FCA continues to apply to Stark and AKS violations, then damages
should be calculated according to the government’s actual loss and not the
gross payment that the government paid out to the providers.286 In these
cases, the government would have reimbursed some entity for the service in
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question, just not this particular entity.287 Therefore, the government should
only be able to recover the additional cost (if any) it incurred from the
noncompliant provider rendering the service in lieu of a more cost-effective
alternative.288 Especially in light of the fact that the government is entitled
to treble damages, these damages should only be calculated based on the
harm the claim caused the government—namely, the marginal cost above the
alternative healthcare provider.
Another FCA reform that will bring much needed clarity to providers is
the federalization of objective falsity as the underlying theory of FCA claims
for lack of medical necessity. As discussed above, the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeal have split on whether a plaintiff must prove the objective falsity of a
claim of medical necessity.289 For a claim to be a “false claim” and thus
actionable under the FCA, it should have to be proven to be objectively false,
meaning that no reasonable physician would consider the procedure as
medically necessary. To allow one physician’s testimony (being paid to
testify) to render another’s judgment invalid creates a volatile situation where
insurance companies are unable to predict how different jurisdictions will try
like cases. To provide national clarity on what constitutes a false claim under
federal law and to best prevent abuse, the federal government should codify
objective falsity as the national standard.
It is imperative that the amount of the recovery for qui tam relators (i.e.,
whistleblowers) in FCA cases be substantially reduced. As explained above,
these whistleblowers stand to gain significantly if their case is successful.290
In fact, in fiscal year 2018, over $2.1 billion in recoveries arose from lawsuits
filed under the qui tam provision of the FCA, of which $301 million went to
these whistleblowers.291 Whistleblowers play an integral role in the
investigative regime; however, it is not proper for whistleblowers to become
rich by virtue of doing the right thing. Whistleblowers should be
compensated for their time and incentivized to come forward to expose
287
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wrongdoing; however, there is no reason for them to be guaranteed a
substantial percentage of the recovery. This leads opportunistic lawyers and
current or former employees to initiate claims to bring about financial gain.292
Many whistleblower lawyers scour health care organizations for employees
who can help expose benign technical violations of Stark or AKS to share in
the potentially robust recovery.293 This is not the best use of healthcare
investigative resources.
Not only does the current whistleblower compensation regime encourage
aggressive reporting and potential frivolous claims, but it also itself provides
a substantial expense that could be recycled back into the healthcare system.
There must be a middle ground between the current percentage recovery
system and a fee-for-service model that compensates whistleblowers
handsomely for their time and efforts exposing fraud and abuse. This will
significantly improve the drain on the healthcare system while
simultaneously rooting out fraud and abuse.
Accomplishing these goals will provide clarity for providers, reduce or
eliminate provider exposure for duly performed services accompanied by
technical violations of the laws, punish providers who intend to defraud the
government, and reduce the incentives for whistleblowers to file frivolous
claims to enrich themselves.
D. Monetary Threshold
Ultimately, the HHS OIG should focus its efforts on fraud and abuse that
costs taxpayers significantly to achieve a better return on investment. The
fraud and abuse investigative regime should not chase technical violations of
Stark and OIG. Instead, it should use fraud prevention systems to focus on
the higher reimbursement modalities that cost the government and taxpayers
billions of dollars, such as the MA risk-adjustment reimbursements and the
pass-through labs. In this regard, the federal government should start with a
baseline monetary threshold of fraud and abuse; a minimum threshold will
focus investigative resources on the big fish and bad actors and lessen the
burden on providers, who are seeing the numbers of investigations skyrocket
over the past several years.294 Investigations are often so broad that they can
cost even the most innocent providers tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars in data analysis and legal fees.295 Specifically, the HHS OIG should
focus its investigations on areas of fraud that will result in substantial
292
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recoupment and/or remove bad actors from the healthcare ecosystem. In the
end, the fraud and abuse investigative and enforcement system should not be
about punishing physicians seeking to help patients and earn a living; rather,
it should be squarely focused on prosecuting malevolent providers who
defraud and abuse the system for undeserved pecuniary gain.
V. CONCLUSION
The current healthcare fraud investigative regime is certainly successful
in rooting out malicious actors of fraud and abuse in the healthcare industry;
however, it tends to unnecessarily harm innocent providers in the process due
to its expansiveness. This harm to providers has a deleterious effect on
innovation and access to care. Refining and honing the focus of healthcare
investigations will not only target the most egregious offenders but will also
protect innocent ones. Implementing these recommendations would reduce
the number of frivolous cases brought by whistleblowers, and cases of
substantive fraud and abuse would be brought to the forefront. If the
proposed reforms are implemented, the overall healthcare system would
benefit without significantly reducing the annual recovery from HHS OIG
enforcement actions.
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